

GOVERNING THE OCCUPIED AREAS OF THE SOUTH PACIFIC: WARTIME LESSONS AND PEACETIME PROPOSALS

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American control of the civilian inhabitants of the South Pacific islands during the war was dictated by military necessity. Civilian populations had to be removed from combat zones to prevent their impeding the fighting. They required medical care to preclude the spread of disease to troops. Workers and their families had to be fed, clothed, and sheltered before they could perform urgently needed work in the construction of military installations. Their communities required supervision to insure security behind the lines. American adherence to international law also meant that the armies in the field were obligated to provide a responsible, humanitarian administration which maintained law and order, protected non-combatants, and preserved native institutions. These were the tasks assigned to Navy Military Government in the conquest and occupation of the Japanese-held mandates in Micronesia: the Marshall, Mariana, and Caroline archipelagos.

This report is a critical review of the governing procedures employed by the wartime civil affairs administration so that this experience may offer suggestions for sound measures in the future direction of Micronesia. These mandates are to be permanent American possessions and hence we must formulate a workable program that is on the one hand efficient and economical and on the other equitable and humanitarian.

ORIENTATION TO THE MICRONESIAN ISLANDS

The Micronesian islands are scattered over an area which is about as large as the United States--they extend some 2600 miles from east to west and 1300 miles from north to south. Micronesia lies east of the Philippines, south of Japan, west of Polynesia and north of the Melanesian islands of New Guinea and the Solomons. Though the total area encompassed is continental in size, the individual islands, as the name Micronesia implies, are small. None is equal to the smallest state in the Union; they range from Guam's 165 square miles to islets less

than a mile in width or length. Collectively, the 1500 volcanic and coral islands and reefs total approximately 1000 square miles which is roughly equivalent to Rhode Island; however, less than ten per cent of the islands have permanent native settlements. Most of the terrain is just above sea level and the highest elevations do not exceed 2000 feet. This sector of the Pacific is directly north of the equator and hence in the tropical zone: rainfall is heavy; the humidity, intense; the temperature, high.

No colonial power has acquired great wealth from the exploitation of Micronesia. The Japanese did profit somewhat from the sugar industries on Tinian and Saipan, the phosphates of Angaur, the bauxite on Ponape, and commercial fisheries and copra throughout the mandates. It is likely that the islands may be an economic liability to the United States. Some of the atolls will be valuable as transportation terminal points. But their principal value, judged in terms of "usability", is as part of the defense of the nation.

The Micronesian population numbers approximately 110,000, of which nearly 60,000 are Micronesians. The remainder are Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese. The origin of the Micronesians is commonly accepted to be an admixture of Melanesians, Polynesians, and Malaysians. More recent Caucasian and Mongoloid influences are also evident. Hardly a single island is occupied exclusively by a homogeneous physical type and members of the same type are located on many different islands. In appearance the population is heterogeneous; pigmentation ranges from a pale-yellow to a deep-brown; body build runs from short-stout to tall-slender; hair varies from straight-light-brown to curly-deep-black; etc. There is no consciousness among Micronesians of being members of one racial stock, each island's population claims it originated in its present habitat. The widely used term Kanaka has been employed in Micronesia to designate the people who live primarily in the Caroline and Marshall archipelagos, in contrast to the Chamorros who reside in the Marianas. While this is generally true, inter-island migrations

¹. The opinions contained in this paper are the private ones of the writer and are not to be construed as official or reflecting the views of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large.

have blurred this distribution. In the Marianas there are over a thousand Kanakas and in the Palau live several hundred Chamorros. The term Kanaka and Chamorro also were meant to designate distinct racial stocks, but this too is dubious. That the categories do have ethnological significance, however, cannot be gainsaid. Kanakas and Chamorros differ markedly. To cite one example, in personality structure the Kanakas are unaggressive, mild, and submissive while the Chamorros are militant, brittle, and explosive. To what extent these differences are attributable to innate temperament and to what degree to cultural conditioning is beyond the scope of this report. The differences are nevertheless relevant in that the governing officials have been forced to take them into account; thus administrative programs which treat these two ethnic groups as co-equals precipitate controversy and conflict.

Despite these variations the basic cultural patterns of the native populations were much alike in the past. A subsistence-handicraft economy prevailed. In the scale of social values, the accumulation of property and work as an end in itself ranked low. The limited natural resources were sufficient to provide the essentials for a secure existence without requiring long hours of disciplined labor. All productive enterprises were done collectively and the output shared by the group as a whole. Village, clan, and family comprised the three central institutions. The villages on each island were united by clan ties and their combined leaderships formed a body which directed programs encompassing the island's total population. A typical village consisted of several hundred members who were united into a series of clans. Clans were tight in-groups, they owned in common the land, were matrilineal, and exogamous. Each clan was also a totemic cult with a code of tabus and an extensive ritual. Families functioned as distinct social units; the lower classes were usually monogamous, although polygyny was practiced. Each household owned its movable properties, was consanguinal in organization, and inherited a body of family traditions which were traced back to its first ancestors.

Social stratification was universal. In the main, social position was fixed at birth, although on some islands individuals could pass from one class to another through the process of marriage, attainments in artisanship and sorcery, the performance of military feats, or the demonstration of skill in administrative tasks. Position in the hierarchy established each individual's rights and duties with reference to other members of the group and as-

cribed eligibility for leadership within each social system. Groups as well as individuals were stratified: families, clans, villages, and islands were ranked in a social hierarchy. Each island was either politically autonomous or associated in a loose confederation which encompassed an archipelago. There was no interest in conquest or territorial expansion. Inter-island wars occurred intermittently, but warfare was seldom sanguinary or of long duration. Most of the islanders were seafaring peoples and hence were acquainted with their oceanic neighbors. There was some knowledge of more distant places such as New Guinea and the Philippines, but few visited them and returned.

The influence of centuries of foreign control on native society is apparent in nearly every sphere of group life. Within a relatively short time after Micronesia became subservient, the population declined in numbers and continued to do so until the beginning of the present century. This trend was partially offset between the two World Wars by a fall in the native death rate so that the birth rate among the islanders once more exceeded the death rate. But the islanders never made a full recovery in numbers. The early decline of Micronesians greatly weakened native social groups for they were unable to carry on many of their traditional activities with the smaller numbers. The immigration of some 75,000 Japanese and several thousand Koreans led to a caste society in which the Japanese formed the elite and all other ethnic groups were reduced to a "peasant-proletarian" status.

Profound changes have taken place in the social life of the natives. Persistent and zealous missionaries succeeded in converting nearly four-fifths of the islanders to Christianity. Missionaries concerned themselves with more than religious ideology. They exerted unrelenting pressure to reform both the inner values and external behavior of the Micronesians. The pre-existing code of morals was branded as indecent and Western standards were offered as a substitute. The scanty costumes were deemed improper and were replaced by European-style clothes. Native dances were discouraged as being immoral. Schools were started to indoctrinate the islanders with not only Christianity but the whole gamut of Western thought. Though on some atolls the population at first resisted these changes, in the course of a generation, missionaries, backed by colonial governments, succeeded in achieving many of their goals.

Colonial governments differed in their administrative procedures, yet their effects on Micro-

nesian life were essentially much alike. The contrasts between Spanish, German, British, Japanese, and American approaches have so frequently been emphasized that the over-all picture has been overlooked. Thus it is customary to refer to the Japanese as an oriental influence, still their objectives in reality differed little from those of their predecessors. All of the foreign control groups maintained that the native social order required "improvement." Hence local leadership was circumscribed in its authority, inter-island warfare was eliminated, villages were consolidated into larger communities, clans and families were stripped of their traditional functions, ceremonies were curtailed, joint ownership of land was abolished, collective enterprise was outlawed, the handicraft-subsistence economy decreed to be outmoded, the leisurely routine of living was branded wasteful, existing sanitary practices were banned, and many native folkways were proclaimed immoral. In lieu of these indigenous patterns, the governments attempted to introduce a mixed feudalistic-capitalistic, commercial, money economy in which the acquirement of a high material scale of living and personal self-advancement were the central values. Through the education of the young as well as by formal legislation, the conversion of native societies was attempted. Native reactions to these changes were mixed; some islanders such as the Chamorro embraced most of the innovations and became highly Westernized in outlook, while others, as for instance the people of Yap, fought every attempt to change their way of living. The majority of the Micronesians adapted what they adopted, combining the old with the new. Micronesians were surprisingly objective in their appraisal of newly introduced traits; Western manufactured goods, modern medical facilities and schools were welcomed but the ancestral concepts of the good life continued unchanged. Moreover, the islanders soon developed effective techniques for dealing with outsiders, they outwardly conformed but kept their ancestral ways in in-group relationships. Seldom did they engage in overt rebellion. Rarely did a colonial government totally achieve its aims. Because the natives bent without breaking, the acculturation of Micronesia proceeded without the social disintegration which so often accompanies superimposed changes. No longer is it possible to depict the Micronesians as a "primitive" people. Yet it would be equally inexact to portray native society as a miniature replica of Western society. As a result of these historic developments, the peoples of the South Seas possess a unique cultural configuration requiring

understanding of its social structure if a sound administration is to be achieved.

ORGANIZATION FRAMEWORK OF CIVIL AFFAIRS

The development of an organization to direct civil affairs was begun by the Navy with an extensive recruitment and an intensive training program. An effort was made to procure men with broad experience in foreign countries, executives in government and business, university instructors in the social sciences, and members of the medical, engineering, and legal professions. The number of applicants was large and the final selection was limited to a few hundred. These men were first indoctrinated in Naval customs and then subjected to a nine-month course presented by the faculty of one of the nation's leading universities. They were exposed to current thinking on past experiences in military government, to international law, geography, and anthropology, and were instructed in several languages.

In order to evaluate this procurement and training program, it is necessary to determine how effective were these measures in obtaining the desired goals. Like any recruitment, chief reliance was placed on formal records. This criterion eliminated the less promising but also made possible the qualification of personalities whose official life histories were more impressive than their aptitude for the task. Some of those selected were found subsequently to be temperamentally unstable, others displayed racial biases, lacked imagination, or were unable to make quick, sound decisions in crises. They were not dropped from the program because all officers of the same rank are presumed to be equally competent.

The curriculum in blueprint was pedagogically sound. Its shortcomings were the staff's lack of first-hand acquaintance with Micronesia and lack of experience in military government itself. To overcome these handicaps, the lecturers sought to orient civil affairs officers to the Pacific as a whole, to examine European military government experiences during the first World War, and to inculcate a point of view. These efforts did succeed in instilling an awareness of the complex issues involved in the administration of civilian affairs. But they provided little knowledge of the actual framework within which military government was called upon to operate in the South Seas. (World War I military administration was based on the theory of only partial physical destruction as well as the continuance of the pre-

existing local government. In Micronesia when the military occupation of an island was completed, physical destruction was total and the prior colonial government was no longer in existence; its officials were dead or evacuated and all records were gone.) Finally, though every effort was made by the educators to form a new set of attitudes among the prospective military government officers, it was not possible in the course of a year to change the ingrained habits which had been built over a lifetime. As a consequence, the educational program made its trainees sensitive to a variety of problems but had no appreciable influence on their outlook or behavior.

In theory, military government was designed to take full advantage of the social sciences--a procedure easy to suggest and hard to achieve. Applying social science means more than just the staffing of bureaus with experts who use technical nomenclature instead of the ordinary idiomatic forms of speech. So, too, it is not reducible to an experimental approach calling for the orderly manipulation of social situations in order to eliminate random efforts in the search for pragmatic answers. Nor is it merely a state of mind in which objective impartiality is substituted for subjective partisanship. Likewise, it cannot be thought of as a fact-gathering procedure, for research *per se* is no panacea for a problem. These attributes are essential but alone are inadequate--as every social scientist who has worked intimately within governmental agencies can testify. The social sciences can be applied only in an organization possessing a systematic procedure, defined goals which can be appraised in a means-ends schema, and a directorship by men who see the need for scientific findings and are capable of embodying them in administrative measures. Seldom do public agencies have these prerequisites: rarely are bureaus logical social structures pursuing defined objectives without deviation, or led by persons capable of translating theoretical principles into concrete programs. Larger societal considerations, political forces, inter-agency relationships, personality factors, and actual circumstances make modifications and compromises inevitable. Hence the process of applying science to administration is one of degree and quality rather than an "all-or-none" proposition.

Judged in this perspective, military government could take relatively little advantage of the social sciences even though its activities clearly pointed to the need. The trained men were too preoccupied with urgent tasks to be released to exercise the role of professional scientist. No full-time administrator can devote the thought and time re-

quired for research. There were no controls of the experimentation and thus no general lessons learned. Similarly, staff training inculcated a verbal objectivity more than an attitudinal one. The organization operating in the midst of chaos and combat could have no orderly procedures for these were dictated by military necessity rather than a long-range foreign policy. Moreover, traditional fears of the academic man made him suspect as being impractical. A military structure does not develop policies by the flow of ideas up the hierarchy but rather consists of categorical orders which are issued from "topside" and descend to the lower echelons. The only sector in which the social sciences actually were used was in the pre-planning stage when the available information on the areas was assembled and analyzed.

As an organization, military government was designed to operate in conjunction with military operations. Adaptability was regarded as more important than consistency or unity. Civil affairs teams were attached to army units and hence were caught in the vortex of service differences. They were under and responsible to both Army and Navy orders. Only through personal relationships was a team able to correlate the varying demands made upon it. While this dual control system was trying it was unavoidable in a combined military operation. As a case study it disclosed the inherent weakness of a decentralized administration without unification in the bureaucratic structure.

Planning for occupation constituted the first major assignment of the neophyte military governors. In each instance the officers who were to administer the conquered area were given primary responsibility for drawing up the detailed program. As a civil affairs team they worked out a division of labor within the group. They estimated the needs of the native population and made arrangements for the handling of the exceedingly complex problem of logistics. Co-ordination of civilian activities with overall military operations entailed numerous conferences between the various military units. Months of labor went into these efforts.

No plan was ever carried out in its pre-conceived form. Planning is based on two salient assumptions: that it is possible to forecast the conditions which will prevail in a forthcoming period and that it is possible to control the forces operating within that anticipated situation. Neither of these two presuppositions held true for Micronesia. The pre-invasion data on the native populations were so unreliable that they actually differed significantly

from the expected. The military picture was constantly changing and with it the needs of the armed forces changed. Military expediency had to take priority over civilian interests. Hence civilian programs were subjected to numerous alterations in order to adjust to the demands of the Army. When a native community was in the way, it was moved; one native village on Guam was relocated in seven different places in the course of two months. On Saipan the service's supply of tetanus serum was soon exhausted and the only other available stockpile was that of military government. That withdrawing this urgently needed serum from the civilians was tragic, no one denied, but under the circumstances there was no alternative. Such unforeseen and uncontrollable factors meant that no previously devised military government plan could possibly be executed *in toto*.

The legal inauguration of military government commences on each occupied island with a series of proclamations. These are posted as soon as an island is secured. In both English and Japanese they declare the area to be under American jurisdiction in accordance with the laws of war and the inhabitants thereafter to be subject to the ordinances enacted by the island's military government. Regulations are posted concerning such matters as the possession of firearms, the movement of people from place to place, communication with the enemy, health and sanitary practices, the establishment of courts and the like. To insure their being understood, these orders are read to the assembled group and fully explained. There were no difficulties in functioning within the prescribed legal code, the provisions of international law are broad and flexible enough to enable administrators to execute their plans without undue constrictions.

Along with other units engaged in a military operation, civil affairs teams are structured to pass through two phases: assault and garrison. This distinction designates not only the stage of combat but also the types of activities engaged in, the administrative pattern, and the lines of authority. In the assault phase, military government concentrates on facilitating the surrender of non-combatants, placing them under protective custody and the provision of disaster relief. An effort is made to protect private property from looting and to secure public records, food stockpiles, and government funds. All measures are of an emergency, make-shift nature. Improvisation constitutes the standard mode of procedure. Within the staff there is no sharp division of labor, everyone participates in each enterprise. The team is small in numbers and their

available supplies are extremely limited. The chain of command is integrated with the invasion force; military government personnel are attached to tactical units and receive their orders direct from the combat commanders. Civilians within each military zone are located in temporary camps behind the assault lines.

The garrison phase begins with the collapse of organized enemy resistance. (The cessation of hostilities does not mean, however, that all of the inhabitants have surrendered. Many continue to hide in caves and in the ensuing months diligent efforts are required to locate and convince them that there is no advantage in remaining further in hiding.) The maintenance and supervision of civilian society is the new frame of reference. Quantities of civilian supplies and additional civil affairs officers arrive. But the incoming supplies never seem to be great enough to meet all of the needs, and so extensive fishing and agricultural programs are started, "scrounging" and salvaging become major enterprises. A variety of otherwise unprocurable goods and services are provided by artisans such as blacksmiths, cobblers, soap-makers, tailors, barbers, and furniture makers who are helped to open shops again. Other workers are organized into labor gangs for jobs ranging from camp construction to working on airfields, harbors, roads and the like.

Gradually a new pattern of administration takes shape. The civil affairs team is enlarged in size and regrouped into departmental units which correspond to the organizational structure of a municipality. Natives are drawn into the government, their leaders jointly serving as a community council and individually acting as police chief, director of group cook-houses, supervisor of sanitation, labor gang bosses, etc. Over-all control shifts from the assault commander to the island's garrison commander. Detailed policies are formulated by a deputy chief of civil affairs who is a high ranking officer on the garrison commander's staff. Civil affairs heads in most instances are untrained in military government and approach native problems from a pedestrian point of view. As a result, conflicts between the policy-forming and the administrative branches are not uncommon. These at times result in contradictory orders, individuals working at cross purposes, and the perversion of programs. Contrasting viewpoints nevertheless do not mean the collapse of civilian activities. Rough compromises take place based on local realities and the personalities involved. In-group unity of action if not in outlook is preserved through military discipline.

Standardization of procedures is never complete for each day presents unique and unforeseen problems. Hence the administrative program is constantly in transition. This flexibility comes with ease to a new structure such as military government and makes possible workable decisions by those most familiar with the local situation. Such a pragmatic approach would be more effective if it were subject to administrative review. There is no research section at any level and hence no way of ascertaining which measures prove successful or otherwise. In the absence of such control there is no accumulation of tested principles of administration and the same errors are repeated on succeeding operations. Available resources of manpower and supplies are not employed to their maximum efficiency.

Despite the handicaps confronting an improvised, fluid organization operating in the midst of war, Navy military government has performed its assault and garrison functions well. But it is apparent that its administrative framework is insufficient for a peacetime government. In lieu of the guiding doctrine of military necessity must come a long-range policy outlining our goals. Improvisation and flexibility are cardinal assets in military government but are inadequate as guiding principles in a more enduring civilian government. What these might be for the postwar administration of Micronesia are proposed in the closing pages of this report.

COMMUNITY PROGRAMS AND SOCIAL MEASURES

The camp is the core of community organization in a war zone. It is an economical, rapid, and convenient way of processing large numbers of individuals whose homes and villages have been destroyed. It is not, however, a satisfactory substitute for permanent communities: facilities are exceedingly primitive, living space is unduly limited, sanitary installations are invariably inadequate, and a camp never quite loses its sense of being a temporary structure.

In the assault phase it was the only possible means of handling the natives and orientals. The established towns were masses of rubble, the military required most of the usable sites, hence the civilians had to be placed in protective custody. The internal organization of camps was loose. Persons claiming to be native leaders were accepted as such and used in a liaison capacity. Ordinances supplementing the proclamations were made as the need appeared, were arbitrarily declared to be in effect and rigidly enforced. Within each camp, sub-units

were established to permit each ethnic group to live together as a separate entity. Interaction between ethnic groups was marked by strain. The Japanese civilians deeply resented the enthusiastic response of the natives to Americans. Occasionally they threatened retribution to the natives when the Japanese army returned. The Chamorros flaunted their rise in status to equality if not superiority to the Japanese and took pleasure in dealing harshly with Japanese civilians when the opportunity presented itself. They constantly asserted their claim to superiority over the Kanakas, thereby arousing antagonism among a group who feel their rise in position under the American rule should be accepted by everyone. The Koreans wished to be completely dissociated from the Japanese, who had previously treated them as inferiors, and were uninhibited in making known their hostile feelings to their former masters. American administrators had to serve as referees in these inter-group conflicts. Decentralization of camp administration was attempted with each ethnic group having its own facilities and government. But complete isolation and compartmentalization is not entirely possible on a small island.

All persons were screened to locate military personnel posing as civilians and to discover those requiring special care such as the sick, wounded, dangerous criminals and the insane. Registration also enabled divided families to locate their kin. Military guards policed the camps to protect the community from enemy infiltrations as well as against the more common menace of GIs seeking souvenirs, women, or other amusements. Guards controlled the movement of civilians but rarely was there any interest among the natives to leave the confines of the camp.

Community activities were all focused on the provision of the bare essentials--food, clothing, and shelter. There was no social life and even children engaged in no games. The civilians were so exhausted and stunned from their ordeal and so fearful of the Americans that they were unable to resume immediately their former ways of living. Civil affairs officers were preoccupied with providing the basic necessities and could not take the time to organize recreational or educational programs. The grim task of assuring survival was not one which could be solved by a single act: it was an acute problem which each day entailed unrelenting efforts. Food consisted of K. rations and such rice stockpiles as were still intact. Clothing came from discarded American and Japanese uniforms. Shelter was made from every conceivable object ranging

from corrugated iron to tarpaulins. Shortages made rationing imperative. The numbers of civilians were too great and the civil affairs personnel too few to permit rationing on an individual basis. Where the latter was tried it was found that rationing items to a people whose culture was totally alien involved misunderstanding which could not readily be solved. Hence the clans or equivalent social units were designated as the rationing unit and thereafter all supplies were distributed to group heads who in turn parcelled out the goods.

Sanitation proved to be an especially serious problem. Water was scarce and hardly enough to permit bathing. (On one island the ocean is not used for this purpose because natives think ocean bathing lowers fecundity.) The local cisterns were destroyed and receptacles were insufficient to collect rain water. Stern penalties and persistent supervision were required to get the Koreans and Japanese to use only the designated latrines. Within the confines of the camp only a limited number of latrines can be built and these often proved inadequate. Heavy rains flooded latrines, spreading dysentery bacilli. Flies were ubiquitous and required constant spraying of DDT to keep them under control. Crowding of large numbers in small shelters added to the health menace, particularly since many had been subjected to various diseases and malnourishment during the assault. Morbidity and mortality rates were high.

The organization of labor gangs involved a number of thorny issues. Labor was voluntary but every employable person was expected to work. No occupational census was available so that individuals were arbitrarily assigned to jobs without regard to skill. Credit instead of pay was given for days worked; the exchange of the yen for the dollar had yet to be made, funds were not available to pay workers, and even when they arrived it seemed pointless to distribute earnings while there was nothing purchasable. Workers began to doubt that they would ever be paid and slackened their efforts or failed to report for duty. To offset this reaction, each social unit was given a daily labor quota and its workers placed under the direction of a labor boss chosen from the group. The boss in turn was responsible for disciplining his men. The labor supply never equalled the demand. A major issue confronting each camp was the proportion of workers to be assigned to other military units. If the percentage was large then urgently needed construction within the camp was neglected and yet the labor requirement of the armed forces had to be given high priority. The question of labor allocation within the civilian

camp would then revolve around the relative merits of various projects underway which lent itself to no simple decision.

With the onset of the garrison phase, many of these tensions and problems were eased. In some instances it was possible to relocate the natives on less congested islands and in others the camp areas were enlarged. Restrictions were relaxed and the initial ordinances reconsidered in the light of individual circumstances. Imperceptibly the general confusion gives way to a routine as natives discover how to act under American rule and the governors acquire some insight into native habits. But the assault stage attitudes do not entirely disappear. Civilians recover slowly from their trauma and never quite learn exactly what the conquering power wants. Officers geared to working in the chaotic atmosphere of combat do not suddenly change their behavior patterns. The reorganization of staff into departments hardly approaches smooth efficiency. Functions nominally invested in one division are assigned to others because of personal aptitudes of the individuals involved. Lacking a fixed social policy, cleavages develop based on varying outlooks with regard to native affairs. Thus one faction operates on the theory that racial equality is a cardinal doctrine, that generous aid should be granted to everyone in need, and that civilians must be trained to take over all activities. An opposing group places a premium on efficiency in getting things done, emphasizes keeping American expenditures to the lowest possible minimum regardless of all else, thinks that natives should not be pampered, and believes primitives incapable of holding positions of responsibility. Such divergencies evoke considerable debate before specific measures can be undertaken.

The supervision of a social order by an outside government often has been done badly in the past and rarely well. It is not humanly possible for any governing body to control all the details of a society. Discrimination in the choice of social relations to be regulated is the core of the problem. Under the circumstances the selection of what to control devolved on the questions of whether the activity in issue affected adversely the military program or was a major threat to the general welfare of the native community. If so, it was subjected to regulation. These crude standards lent themselves to a variety of interpretations; some administrations gave natives almost a completely free hand and others sought to direct all affairs.

Community councils were found indispensable. They brought together native leaders and

civil affairs officers for an exchange of views and information. Membership on the councils varied from island to island. In some instances native representatives were elected by secret ballot. Each ethnic group was allotted delegates in proportion to its numbers. The most characteristic features of successful community councils were freedom of expression and genuine efforts to reach agreements which embraced the interests of all groups concerned. This consumed quantities of time for each question had to be translated into two or more languages. It also required great patience on the part of the Americans who were unaccustomed to native modes of reaching a group decision: for example, islanders will never openly oppose another opinion but will talk around the point until the other side of the question becomes apparent; nor will they vote until certain that there is in-group unanimity. Japanese and Korean councillors had not been accustomed under the prior social order to make suggestions or to judge the merits of proposals but rather merely to attend meetings to receive orders. Hence civilian representatives needed continuous reassurance before they would actively participate in council discussions. Less successful councils were those dominated by officers who viewed them as mere assemblages in which to make announcements and to give orders to community leaders. Poor native representations occurred when persons holding positions of responsibility under the Japanese were disqualified. Such a policy eliminated the ablest leadership in the community; leaders selected from the residual group had little influence on their own people and their views were not shared by their constituency.

Social life revived without any great amount of aid from the government. Human beings have an amazing power of recovering from disaster. If given a change, they revert back to some of their pre-existing modes of living and adjust to new conditions, finding some bases for accommodating the old and the new. The islanders once more resumed their in-group feuds as well as their formal social life. Through daily interaction with Americans and in schools the English language and many American folkways were assimilated. There were no textbooks at first and then those obtained were outmoded discards from American schools. Other educational equipment was unprocurable. Naval enlisted men with any academic background were drafted as teachers and they learned their pedagogical principles the hard way. Everyone wanted to attend school; day and night classes for men, women and children were established. But there was no orientation to the ed-

ucational program. For example, what ought to be taught to the Japanese and Korean children, who would return to their homelands after the war, was in doubt. So, too, how much of the American democratic philosophy might be taught in view of the local situation had no ready answer. Obviously there is great need for the replacement of the current haphazard acculturation by an integrated social program.

The restoration of native society to its prewar levels is not accomplished in the garrison phase. Ships were too urgently needed to carry war materials to be used for the provisioning of the natives with more than the bare essentials. The wartime controls on the local economy precluded self-dependency. Nearly all fiscal assets are frozen, no bank deposits have been released, the exchange rate between dollars and yen wiped out most local capital, no compensation has been paid for private property destroyed, all commercial enterprises such as the copra trade, phosphate mining, and the sugar industry are inoperative, wage scales are disproportionately low in relationship to prices. A majority of the civilians, therefore, will require public assistance during the transition period. Economic reconstruction will be entangled with many related problems. For example, shall the orientals who play a vital role in the local economy be repatriated? While some of the Japanese and Koreans wish to return to their homelands, many do not; they have lived on the islands for some time and their children know no other life. Their labor will be needed and substitute workers would be hard to find. The compensation of land-owners will be complicated by native and Japanese land-owning systems. Sectors of farm land have been permanently destroyed, thereby necessitating resettlement of agricultural families. The kind of economy possible in areas containing permanent military garrisons will differ markedly from that of prior periods. This will mean readjustments in native occupational activities and in consequence alterations of the indigenous modes of living. Social reorganization will also entail numerous vexing issues. How can the ideal of native-self-government be coordinated with American domination? Must all Japanese-introduced traits be removed even when they are beneficial to the islanders? How can acculturation be guided so that only selected aspects of western folkways are adopted and the integrity of native society preserved? Such questions can be ignored and we can drift from one compromise to another or we can set up a rigid plan and insist on a schedule. Neither seems desirable. The only logical answer

historic precedents suggest is some pattern between these two extremes. The experiences of the civil affairs administration in the South Seas make obvious the inadequacy of any simple formula.

THE FUTURE ADMINISTRATION

On the basis of our wartime experiences, proposals may now be offered for the peacetime governing of Micronesia. It is apparent that the supervision of native societies in the South Pacific is a difficult and complex task.

The minimum standards necessary for performing this task are: an able staff, an integrated organization, and a coherent program. One of these alone will not work but all three will make the kind of administration we declared at San Francisco to be our national policy.

Procurement of an able staff will require the recruitment and training of personnel; the needed manpower should include both Americans and Micronesians. Some of the former might be drawn from the more successful members of the current military government organization and the latter from the more promising members of the younger generation. The traditional type of academic training is useful as a background but inadequate for preparing individuals for their future duties. The ordinary college education makes for intellectual competence which is only one of the required attributes of an effective administrator. Prolonged classroom exercises are no substitute for an apprenticeship in actual administration. It needs to be recognized frankly that no American university now offers the advanced type of training required: it was earlier pointed out that institutions which gave courses on military government during the war were staffed by instructors with little personal experience in the administration of native affairs in the South Pacific. But there are among the current group of civil affairs officers a number of competent teachers who might become the nucleus of a school. Their duties could include both academic studies in theory and practical supervised field work. Micronesians selected for government posts need to be sent to America for orientation and technical education. Many natives are eager to accept such an opportunity and possess the required mental aptitudes for such work. But one caution must be stressed: there is need for some orderly procedure for the elimination of the unfit and the rewarding of the fit. At present neither Naval nor Civil Service procedures provide sufficient control to dismiss individuals who are emotionally unstable,

racially biased, or otherwise incompetent. Without such protection, there is real danger of the organization being staffed with marginal men who are refugees from more competitive areas of life and find security in bureaucracy. It is equally important to offer positive rewards commensurate with the high quality service expected of the men who make Micronesian administration their lifetime work. Finally, the trained staff must not be hampered by high-ranking heads who exercise final authority yet possess little understanding or interest in Micronesians. It is therefore essential that the top leadership be chosen with as much care as the remainder of the staff and that they be exposed to recent thought on the administration of native affairs.

A variety of organizational schemes for the administration of Micronesia are conceivable. The precise form the agency assumes is secondary to the logic of its structure. The basic provisions should include at least the following:

1. A single agency which possesses both the authority and the responsibility for the direction of native affairs throughout the American-held islands of the South Pacific.

2. A policy-forming body, presided over by an Assistant Secretary of the Navy. This council would be composed of three American civilians who are appointed by the President and an equal number of Micronesians to be elected by the natives of the islands--one from each archipelago.

3. A technical staff to serve as bureau chiefs in charge of major programs. These would be appointees of the Micronesian Council outlined above. They would be experienced public officials and experts in such matters as public health, child welfare, international trade, and education.

4. A resident commissioner who would be in immediate charge of each archipelago, and assistant commissioners to serve as island administrators. Commissioners would also head a local council consisting of native leaders representing each ethnic group. Administrative assistants to the resident commissioner could travel from island to island providing specialized services.

This organization would be empowered to enact civil law which should embody both American legal principles and native customs. In addition, each native society would be incorporated and self-governing with respect to purely domestic affairs. Incorporated societies could enact local ordinances, collectively hold lands, operate economic enterprises, appoint policemen, establish lower courts, and direct native activities in accordance with the

indigenous customs. To qualify for participation in the new government, inhabitants must take an oath of loyalty to the United States.

A coherent program would coordinate immediate measures with long-range plans. Some of the precepts of military government should not be embraced by a peacetime civil administration. Thus a military definition of a social problem does not coincide with a sociological conception of one. The former uses as its frame of reference obstacles which obstruct the conduct of the war while the latter employs as its chief construct disorganizing forces which undermine the whole social fabric. Although these two approaches are not inherently antithetical and sometimes merge, they entail different types of orientations. Military government is concerned primarily with temporary measures which will alleviate the immediate crises without regard to long-time solutions. It cannot seek to reform native institutions merely because they make for maladjustments. Thus the underlying problems have been deferred and now await action.

Caution, however, is needed in proposing more permanent remedies. Americans are accustomed to think in terms of direct, quick action and presume that any undesirable social condition should be corrected. Actually many human problems cannot be solved by direct governmental manipulation and become more rather than less involved when such control is attempted. Some social difficulties are offset by the development of compensating factors without the eradication of the original source of the trouble. People often find it easier to add balancing features to their pre-existing patterns than to change them completely. Moreover, some pathological conditions are preferred to the readjustments necessary to eliminate them. Others are so intrinsically a part of the social structure that their deletion would be a greater loss than a gain. Hence even though it is most tempting for Americans to advocate progressive reforms, especially of primitive societies, sound plans must avoid the temptations to "do something" about each and every native problem and yet design a positive program that has reasonable promise of preparing Micronesia for the new social order within which it will function.

The ultimate goals should be the development of self-dependency, economic and cultural. To

restore native economy, an extensive rehabilitation program should be launched. Surplus war property and equipment could be used to rebuild native villages. As far as possible the natives would be relocated on islands which are not permanent military bases and which have sufficient natural resources to provide the essentials of life. International trade in such products as fish, copra, and phosphate should be restored and ample protection made to assure that the profits of such commerce accrue to the benefit of the islanders. Wage scales need to be adjusted to the cost of living. Public and private funds now frozen should be released and compensation provided for war damages. A tax system might be introduced to help meet the costs of public improvements and to enable the people to contribute to their own welfare.

To rebuild the native culture, communities should be aided but not dominated. The Micronesians need to be freed as far as possible of external intervention and minute regulation of their daily lives. American forces must be prevented from treating the islanders as curiosities and expendables for their personal convenience. At the same time, the Micronesians need to be prepared for further participation in world society. This they are eager to do and only require guidance in the development of discriminating standards. To achieve this end, a well-balanced educational system ought to be developed. Schools in the initial period will require American teachers but soon will be able to turn the task over to the younger native generation. Natives with special promise might be granted scholarships to continue their higher education in American schools. Finally, every effort should be made to preserve that undefinable but essential ingredient of a vital society, its sense of dignity among men and destiny in the total scheme of things.

These are the norms. They are easier to establish now when we are starting than a generation hence. The Micronesians are enthusiastic about their future under American aegis. It is to be hoped that they will find their loyalty to the United States reciprocated. So often in the past social scientists have engaged in post-mortems of social problems--pointing out the errors made and what needs to be done to correct old problems. Here is the chance to build a new social order well.